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ENTREPRENEUR- INVESTOR NEGOTIATIONS: INVESTIGATING THE POWER GAP
Karen Page, Un iversity of Wyoming
Robert Sprague, U ni versity of Wyoming
Federal Securities Laws are design ed to ensure that investors are provided with sufficient information to
make an informed in vestmelll. These Laws presume that investors are relatively nai've and powerless
compared to th e relatively sophisticated and powe~ful sellers of securities. In the new venture arena,
however, it is often the case that sellers, the entrepreneurs, are relatively nai've and powerless compared to
the investors, who tend to be expert in venture finance. This paper explores these heretofore unexamined
power imbalances and presents attributes of th e entrepreneurs and their resources that may affect
entrepreneurs' ability to negotiate with venture capitalists.

INTRODUCTION

venture ca pitali sts.
Loa ns to the bu siness are li mited to the extent of the
coll atera l of the owners and create a repayment burden
w hil e the bu s iness is still deve lop in g. Se lling part of the
bu s iness to an investor offers a viab le alternative, as the
amount of in v ;;ted fund s is sb-uctured on the future
in co me of the e nterpri se (rather than the current
unencumbered assets of its own ers), and there is no
repa yme nt burden.
Venture capitali sts ha ve become a significant source
of new venture financin g in recent years. B y 2003 , there
were nea rly 2,000 venture fund s actively mana ging over
$25 0 bill ion in bu sin ess in vestments (Leavitt, 2005). T he
typical ventu re capi ta l process is for a venture capita l
fim1 to fom1 a limi ted partnership , w ith itse lf as the
ge nera l pann er. Limited partners arc th en sol ic ited to
pledge fund s to a parti cu la r venture fund . The limited
partn e rs are usua ll y in stitutiona l in vestors and hi ghwea lth individua ls. T he venture capita l firm mana ges the
fund , se lectin g w hi ch ventures to invest in. The venture
cap ita l finn co llects a set management fee , as well as
shares in pos iti ve retum s eam ed by the fund (Bankman &
Co le, 200 1).
AJ1ge ls, 1n contTa st, are genera ll y hi gh- wea lth
indi vidual s w ho in vest directl y in a bu sin ess at a very
ear ly staJi-up pha se. T he avai labi lity of angels has
progressed beyond just '' fr iends and fami li es. " Ange ls
have bec ome more prominent a nd accessib le, even
banding together into organ izations to share leads and
informat ion (Leav itt, 2005) .
Whe the r the initial venture fundin g is pro vided by an
ange l or venture ca pita lists, it is ex pected that there w ill
be sub sequent rounds of fin anc in g as the bu siness
deve lops, often in vo lvin g more tha n one venture capi ta l
fund (Gom1an and Sa hlman , 1989). Th e investors' goal Is
a liquidi ty event , usua ll y in the form of an ini tia l publlc

The iconic perspective of modern entreprene urship
envis ion s a handful of bright, young entrepreneur
develop in g the ir product with minimal resources,
some times litera ll y in a garage, onl y to be " di scovered"
by venture capitali sts w ho fund an d muture the fledg ling
e nterp1i se until it beco mes a publi c corporation and
lea der in its indu stry. The fairy tai l includes the
tTansfo rmation of the yo ung, idea li st ic entTeprene urs into
captain s of th eir industry.
R ea li ty, howe ve r, does not a lways comport with thi s
ev ide nce
s uggests
th e
idy lli c
v1cw . Anecdotal
entrepre ne urs fa ce a much harsher rea lity as th ey place
confide nce in ve ntu re capitali sts w hose bus in ess mode ls
are ba sed on generatin g e normou s return s o n a sma ll
percentage of the ir many in vestments, rathe r than
nurtu1in g fl edgling en b·eprene
urs
(Holdin g a nd Ca rl sen ,
1999) . Neverthe less, so me e ntre pre ne urs do very we ll
a nd recei ve deal tern1s that a ll ow them to gro w their
compa ni es wit h the a ppropri ate amount of attention from
the in vesto rs. The aim of thi s paper is to ex plore th e
heretofore unexam in e d p ower imba lances between
enb·epreneurs and in vestors and to postulate so me sou rces
of power that ma y e nabl e entTeprene urs to negotiate
effecti ve ly with inves tors.

Business Start- Ups and Venture Ca pital
Because a start -up bu s in ess does no t ha ve an
estab lished produc t in the market, th e re are gener::tll
y
ttle li
o r no re venues in the bu siness' na sce nt yea rs . A
small , sta rt-up bu s iness ha a var iet·y of so urces from
whi c h it may draw operatin g ca pita l: th e sav in gs of the
0\\11e rs; bank loa ns. pa rti c ul a rl y those g ua ranteed by th e
Sma ll Bus ine ss Assoc iation ; fri end s and re lati ves;
wea lth y indi vid ua ls - often referred to as '·a nge ls"; and
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capita lists pursue less industry and geographi c
divers ifi cat io n w hen in vestment ri sk is hi gh; therefore
they manage ri sk thro ugh monitoring a nd in vo lve ment
rather than through di versification (Sapienza & Gupta ,
1994). When dec idin g w he th er to fu nd a new venture,
venture cap itali sts mu st consider more than the potential
success of the venture, and hence the pos iti ve return on
in vestment. Ventu re ca pitali sts mu st also decide how be st
to structure the financing to protect the ir own interests
whi le simulta neous ly enhancing the likelihood that the
new venture w ill succeed. The fo undation of thi s
structure is govemance and control (Bam ey et a!. , 1989 ;
U tset, 2002).
A ltho ug h venture cap itali sts do not usual ly purchase a
maj orit·y of the venture's stock, they often purchase
enough to contro l the company 's board of d irectors,
w hi ch has the ultimate respon sibility of managing the
co mpa ny . TJl add itio n, venture ca pitali sts provide
finan c ing in stages, rep le ni shin g ca pital on ly if th e
ventl1re re mai ns a pote ntia lly viab le in vestment. F ina ll y,
the ventl1re cap ita li sts w ill req uire di sin centi ves for the
e ntrepre ne ur to ex it from the venture, parti c ularl y by
requiring that entrepreneurs se ll their interest in the
co mpany should they leave (Utset, 2002) .
With thi s level of control, venture capitali sts can exert
po wer in a num ber of ways . They can terminate the
e ntreprene ur if the y beli eve mo re co mpetent seni o r
m a nagement is needed and the entrepre neur is no longer
necessary for the viabil it y of the venture. Accord in g to
venture cap it a li sts, the most s ignifi cant reaso n new
ventures fai l is beca use of in effective se nior management,
meanin g that venture ca pitali sts wi y"
ll " frequ e ntl
fire the
origi na l senior m::magement (Gom1an & Sah lm an, 1989) .
Ind eed, so1 e enh·epreneur
s
have thoug ht their dreams of
a successful start-up were reali zed when venture
capi ta li sts :1grced to in vest, on ly to find that th ey were
left wi th no thing (Holding an d Carlsen, 1999).
U ltimate
ly, if the venture capitali sts be li eve th e ve nture is
no ionger via ble , the y can li quidat e it, w hich includ es
havin g th e compa ny bu y ba c k th e venture ca pita li sts'
stock ( if the re are assets to pa y for the rede mpti on)
(Utset, 2002) .
T he entreprene ur , understandabl y, will more than
like ly fight an y termin atio n or liquid atiOn decis io n by the
venture capit:1li sts. The e ntrepren eu r
IS a lso
not
necessa ril y power less, parti c ularl y if th e entrep reneur
ho ld s the kno\\' ledgc nece ssary to m:1ke the venture
viab le. Thi s m:1 y set up a connict between the
e ntrep rene ur and th e ,·e nture capitali sts that ultimate ly
may be de stru cti w to th e ventu re . I r the venture
ca pitali sts a rc at odd s with the entrepreneur, but the

offering (IPO) of the stock of the venture . The IPO
creates a market for the stock of the venture, allowing the
investors to sell their ownership interest in the venturetheoretically for a substantial profit. Even where the
investors and the entrepren eur are equally committed to
maximizing shareholder wealth , they may have recurring
disagreements regardin g how to prioritize operating goals
(Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). T he entrepreneur 's ultimate
goal is to build a viable business . The investors' "long
term" goal is a positive return on the investment
portfolio, of which the entrepreneur 's company is just
one part, within 7-12 yea rs, the typical life of a venture
fund (Nesheim, 2000). As a res ult, in vestors and the
entrepreneur have different, and poss ibl y conflicting,
priorities.
Investing m small , sta rt-up ventures invol ve
significant risk (Sapienza & G upta , 1994; U tset, 2002).
Risk can have its reward s: venture funds collectively
reported return s of 150% in 1999 . But risk also
sometimes means loss: as venture funds co ll ective ly
reported return s worse than negative 25% in 2002
(Cumming & Macintosh , 2004). One stud y has indicated
that approximately 7% of in vestments account for more
than 60% of venture capitalists' profits, whi le one-third
of investments result in (sometimes tota l) losses (Bhjde,

1992).
There are signifi cant unknown va ri abl es assoc iated
with start-up ventures. By definition , the bus iness mode l
of a start-up has not been tested agai nst a n actua l market.
Most start-ups do not yet even have a product. It 1s
unknown whether the idea ca n be co nverted to a
marketable product, whether a co mpe titi ve product is
about to be intToduced in the market, or whether the
entrepreneur can manage an operational and gro w in g
business (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). lJl addition , each
party 's self-interest ma y in crea se the ri sk of failure.
Venture capitali sts are on ly wi llin g to provide th e
minimum fund s necessary for the venture to meet di screte
milestones, thereby minimi zin g the venture cap itali sts '
risk if the venture appears un successful in its ear ly stages .
At the same time, the entrepreneur is loath to give up too
much ownership and contTOl in the business . "Thus both
venture capita li sts and entre prene urs willingly conspire to
impose stringent limits o n the res ili ency of the ir
enterpri ses" (Gonnan & Sa hlman, 1989:238). Whi le
venture capita li sts and entrepre ne urs may in itiall y believe
they have common goa ls a nd are a partn ership , when
things go badl y, the ir interests diverge (Gorman &
Sahlman , 1989).
Venture cap ita li sts atte mpt to co ntro l ri s k throu gh
governance procedures. Studies indi cate tha t venture
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entrepreneu r is too va luabl e to the venture to tem1inate,
the res ult may be retali ati on.
Many of th ese iss ues a re covered by the tem1 sheets
nego ti ated by the parti es a t the time of the investment.
The exte nt to whi c h these ten11S favor either the
entre pre neur or the investor de pends on the relati ve
power of the parti es.

who accept less advantageous terms . From whence does
thi s power derive? We develop eleven proposition s
settin g forth attributes of entrepreneurs or their resources
that may con tribute to the entre preneurs' power. In the
context of the proposition s that follow, the "entrepreneur"
in c lud es a ll founders involved in the management
dec isions o f the startup .

Power

Attributes of the Entrepreneur

M ost definiti o ns of power ta ke as the ir root Weber ' s
( 1947) c lass ic de finition o f power as the probabili ty that a
person ca n carry o ut hi s or her will despite res istance.
F rench a nd R aven ( 1959) ra refied W e ber's definiti on by
determinin g fi ve bases of power: ( 1) reward power;
(2) coerc ive power; (3 ) exp e rt po wer; (4) legitimate
power; and (5) referent power. Emerso n ( 1962:32) argued
that " power is a pro pe rty of the socia l re lation; it is not an
attrib ute of an actor. " T hus, power o nl y ari ses w ithin a
parti c ular context between two or more actors.
In the context of tra nsacti on s, power can dete m1in e
th e allocat ion of rewards of any agreement (Kim, 1997 ;
Mann ix, 1993; Pinkley e t a !. , 1994). C onseq uentl y, the
greater one party's power re lative to the othe r party 's, the
more reso urces the more powerful pa rty can clai m (K im
e t a!. , 2005). Bacharach and Lawler's ( 198 1)
co mprehen sive review of the re leva nt literature suggests
that negot ia to rs w ho are perce ived as havin g grea te r
bargai n ing power than their oppo ne nts can en fo rce the ir
wi II. Fw1he r, negotiators w ith lower percc i ved power
gene ra ll y ca nnot a nd do not res ist the dema nds of more
powe rfu l o ppon e nts (llorai & Tedeschi , 1969; M ichene r,
Law ler, & Bacharach , 19 73). Converse ly, w hen the
power of two parties is equa l, eac h s ide is be tter ab le to
res ist th e domin eering behav ior of the other (cf. PinykJe
,
Nea le, & Benn ett, 1994) .
T hus, w he n an e ntre pre ne urs are negotiating w ith
pote nti al in vestors, the re lat ive power of the
en tre prene urs an d in vestor large ly detem1in e w ho
rece ive
th e greater benefit from the in vestment.
Neverthe less, the entre prene urs' pe rsona l and reso urce
attTibutes ca n en hance their power re lat ive to the in vestor.
In thi paper, we gene ra te e leve n propos iti o ns rega rdin g
pote ntial so urces of powe r to entre pre ne urs w ith respect
to investors.

Entrepreneurs vary in terms of financial and technical
ex per1ise a nd experi ence. W e beli e ve four of these factors
may be partic ularl y important in affecting entrepreneurs'
powe r vis-a- vi s the investor: (1) experience in new
ve nture finan ce; (2) gen e ral financial expenence;
(3) ex perti se rn the entrepren e ur ' s indu stry; (4)
negotiatin g experi ence; and (5) skin in the game.

E xperience in New Venture Finance
Whil e ma ny en b·epr
ene ur
are ne w to the market for
venture fin anc in,, othe r e ntrepre ne urs have repeated
ex peri ence. W esthead, Ucbasa ra n, and Wri ght (2005)
describe entrepreneurs as " nov ice" entrepreneurs, who
have no pri or business OWllership ex peri ence; "seri al"
entre prene urs, w ho have so ld or closed a business in
w hi c h they had a n own ers hip stake and who eurTently
have an ownership sta ke in new , indepe ndent bu siness;
and " portf
o li o" entre pre ne urs, w ho ha ve conc unent
owne rship sta kes in two or mo re independent bus inesses .
T he la t1 cr two ca tego ri es suggest that experi e nce in
en tre pre ne urs hip inc rease the e ntre prene ur ' s power for
three reaso ns. Fi rst, ex pe ri ence prov ides the entre prene ur
w ith a bas is for compari son w hen negoti atin g with
in vestors (B abcoc k e t a!., 200 5). Second , an ex pe ri ence
c urve e ffect may e nab le the e ntre preneur to capitalize on
hi s o r he r exi stin g knowl edge base and intem al
infrastTuc ture, there by reduc in g costs of capital (Reagan s
e t a!. , 2005) Third , ex peri ence is likely to generate
cred ib ilit y o n the part o f the entTeprene ur (cf. Brokaw &
Mc Dev itt, 1994). As Westhead a nd Wri ght (1999) and
Mac Mill an, Siega l, and SubbaNa ras imha ( 1985) fo und ,
th e entrepre ne ur ' s ex peri e nce i used by potenti a l
investors to screen appli cation s for assistan ce. Thu s, not
onl y w ill ex pe ri e nce help th e entrepre ne ur to see the
re lati onship w ith the in vesto r and the ac tual tem1 s in a
mo re so phi sti cated li ght, ex peri e nce wi ll al so all ow the
e ntre prene ur to be seen by th e in vestor as more ca pabl e
and credibl e.

So urces of En trepr eneurs' Pow er
Ce rtain ly man y ve nture fi na nce dea ls conc lude w ith
te rm s that are favo rab le to both pa rti es. We contend tha t
entre pre ne urs th a t engage in suc h positi ve dea ls have
more po we r wit h respec
t
to in vestors than e ntTeprene urs
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relative to investors than entrepreneurs with less
entrepreneurial experi ence.

Proposition 4: Entrepreneurs with spec ifi c
training or experience in negotiation s wi ll have
more power relative to in vestors than entrepren eurs
without training or experience in nego tiation s.

Financial Expertise
Expert power is demon strated when an indi vidual has
knowledge or expertise relevant to others (French and
Raven, 1959). Fiske ( 1961) suggests that the hallmark of
expertise is the ability to adjust one 's skill s to be adapti ve
and successful even in the face of changes in si tuation al
demands . In ventme finance situations, it can generall y
be assumed that the investor has more financial
knowledge and expertise than most entrepreneurs.
However, to the extent that the entrepreneurs have their
own financial expertise, the entrepreneurs' power relative
to the investor will be enhanced.

Skin in the Game
'·Skin in the game" is a term coined by billionaire
in vestor Warren Buffet to refer to personal investment in
an enterpri se (Morrin g & Taverna, 2005). Scholars and
co mmentators alike have suggested that a party ' s skin in
the game in creases personal commitment to a successful
venture (Tennant, 2005 ; Koehn, 2005; Gray, 2004 ;
B ischel, 2004) . Anecdota l evidence suggests that venture
capita li sts are congini zant of thi s concept. As
entrepreneur G lenn Cornett ex plain ed, venture capitalists
di scounted the valu e of hi s busin ess at an earl y stage
because so littl e money had been put into it (Cornett,
2005) . Accordingly, a greater persona l in vestment by the
entrpreneurs can be expected to Improve the
entrepreneurs' negotiating position.

Proposition 2: Entrepreneurs with fi nancial
expertise wi ll have more power relative to
investors than entrepreneurs without fin anc ia l
expertise.
Rare Substantive Expertise

Proposition 5: EntTepreneurs with mo re persona l
finan c ial in vestment in the start up will have more
power relative to investors than entrepreneurs with
less personal financia l investment in the start up .

Rare substantive expertise in the entrepreneurs' fi eld
may al so enhance the entrepreneurs' power, particularly
when the field is a popul ar one for venture capi ta l. Where
the value of the enterprise lies within the entrepreneur,
then it is less likely that the in vestor will jeopardi ze the
relationship with the entrepreneur than if the va lu e lay
within phys ical assets or intell ectual property.

Attributes of the Ent1·epreneur's Resources
Even vvhere an entTepreneu r has some personal
attributes that may be advantageou s in negotiations with
in ves tors, enh·epreneur
s
likel y to strengthen their power
through the accumu lat ion of certa in resources that are
also like ly to en hance power. These in clude (1) stTon g
intell ectua l nropeity, (2) loya l board members, (3) hi gh
status alli an ce partners, (4) hi gh status lega l co unse l, (5)
an advisory board, and (6) the length of time the start up
ha s been in busin ess .

Proposition 3: Entrepreneurs with rare expertise in
their fi elds wi ll have more power relat ive to
investors than entrepreneurs without rare experti se
in their field s.
Negotiating Experience
Specific experience or training in negot iations shou ld
also give entrepreneurs power in their negotiation s with
investors. Nea le and Northcraft ( 1986) fo und that whil e
both expert and amateur negot iators were ab le to reac h
integrative ("w in-win") solution s over time, expert
negotiators were more integrati ve ea rl y 111 the
negotiation s and tended to secure hi gher average
outcomes than amateur negotiators. Thompson ( 1990)
found that experienced negotiators made more accurate
judgments about the other party ' s pri oriti es and were
more li kely to negotiate more favo rab le agree ments.
We can ex pec t, then , that entTepreneurs w ho are
ex peri enced negotiators will be ale to negoti ate more
favorabl e terms than wi ll novi ce negotiators.

https://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol2/iss1/7

Strong Intellectual Property
Holdin g and Carl sen ( 1999) report an in cident that
occ un·ed in 199 1: It wa s every entrepreneur's wo rst
ni ghtmare .
One day EP Techno logies wa s seek in g ve nture ca pita l
fina nci ng to expa nd its medical equipment busin ess . T he
next day an entirely new co mpan y - financ ed by the sa me
venture cap ita li sts - arose to make exactl y th e sa me
product for exac tl y the same market.
T heft of inte ll ectual property, euph emi sti ca ll y ca ll ed
·'co mpetiti
gence
te ,"ve in lli
is an import:mt concern for
every entTepreneur. Legitimate in vestors are ac ute ly
co ncem ed with the prot ecta bility of entrepreneurs'
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inte ll ectua l propeny (Klein , 2005; Schneider, 2002)); the
tronger th e protection , th e more va luabl e is th e propeny.
Le s legitimate investors w ill be concerned for other
reasons; the weaker the pro tection , the easie r it is to
a ppropriate. In e ither event, stron g intell ectual proper1 y
protection should pro vide more power to entrepreneurs
than weak inte ll ectual propeny protec ti o n

statu has been shown to have a number of positive
economi c benefits for the actor, ranging from survival to
organizational growth and profitability (Baum & Oliver,
1992; Podoln y & Phillips, 1996; Podolny 1993). In one
of th e more co mpelling demonstrations of the economic
va lue of ti es to hi gh-status actors, Stuart and his
co ll eagues ( 1997) examined the economic effects of
intero rgani zational
networks
of
privately
held
biotec hn o logy firm s. Stuart and hi s colleagues found that
an affiliation wi th a prominent alliance partner increased
the marke t value of the biotechnology firm. Consistent
w ith an interpretati o n of these ties as carriers of
leg itim acy, Stuart and hi s assoc iates found that the effect
of affiliation s vari es in verse ly with the age ofthe start-up .
Tn other words, yo ung start-ups benefit more from the
status of the ir network partners than do older start-ups.

Proposition 6: Entrepre neurs who have strong
intellectual propeny protection w ill have mo re
power relative to in vesto rs than entTepre neurs with
weak intellectual property protection.
Loyal Board Members
H old in g an d Ca rl sen (1999) report another in c ident
that highlights in the im portance of loya lty: In June 1997,
Shyam Das sat down for sodas with venture capita li st
Jeffrey Draza n at the P eppermil l R esta urant in C upertino.
Drazan and hi s firm, S ierra Ventures, had put about $7
million into th e co mpan y Da s founded the year b efore,
and after a few minutes of small talk , Drazan sai d he
wa nte d another Sierra d irec tor on th e board. Das was
wary. For year . he had worked a lone to perfect the
com pan y's produc t - an in genious dev ice ca pab le of
storing more data on a co mputer di sk than an yon e
thought po s ible. And he co uld fee l Dra za n pry ing it
away. B ut Draza n assu red him th ey wo uld "al ways be
together," so Das relented. lt wa s a criti ca l mi stake.
Two month later. D as ,,·as out. fired from hi s own
co mpan y - with D razan 's nc'' director cast ing th e
deciding vote. A nd although Da ::, still he ld mil lion s of
hare of com pan y stock. he sa id the directors eve ntua lly
found a way to betray him one more lime. "When I
handed over thi s company." Das said
wa s. "It
just like
lo sing a child." Das · experience illustrates th e importan ce
of perso nal loyalty on the board. Whi le it is often the case
that in vestors will ins ist on board sea ts, and even board
co ntrol, loyal board members provide at least some buffe r
.
to thi S pO\\er

Proposition 8: Entrepre neurs with high status
a lli a nce partn e rs wi ll have more power relative to
in vesto rs th an entrepreneurs w ithout hi gh status
a lli ance partn ·s.
High Status Legal Co un sel
J ust as hi gh statu s a lli a nce partn ers may be a s ignal of
quality and hence give an e ntrepre ne ur more bargaining
powe r, so too ma y the status of the entrepreneur 's genera l
coun se l. Some law firm s are known in the venture
financ e industry as hi gher statu s and more connected,
knowl edgeab le, and ca pab le th a n other la w firm s
(Ph il lip & Z uckerma n, 2002; Phillips, 2001 ). Thus, such
law firm s may pro vide th e entTeprene ur w ith power
rela tive to the in vesto rs in a t least two ways. First, these
law firm s ma y s uggest a certa in sophi sti cation on the part
of the e ntTepreneur that w ill tran s late into more respect.
Second, the ex perti se o f th e law £irm s themse lves in th e
domain of venture ca pital s hould inure to the bene fit of
the entTep reneu rs thro ugh good lega l advice.
Propo sition 9: Entrepre ne urs with hi gh statu s
lega l cou nse l w ill ha ve more powe r relative to
in ves tors than en tre pren e urs wi th low status lega l
coun sel.

Propo~ition 7: Entrepreneurs with loya l board
members on the board wi II have more power
relative to mve stors than en tre prene urs wit hout
loyal board members on the board.

Hi g h

S tatu~

A lli ance

A dvi so r y Board
Fox ( 1982), m the I larva rd Bus in ess Rev iew,
reco mm en ded that entre prene urs c reate " qua si-board s of
direc tors·· or adv isory boa rd s to a ll ow th e e ntrepreneurs
to ga th er ex pert adv ice w ith o ut th e impos in g on the
adv i ors th e lega l o r fidu c iary burden s of be in g boa rd
members. These advi sors ca n offer advice w ithout

Partner~

A number of sc holars have argued th at if an
mdi\ 1dual"'> partne rs posses'> cons id e rable legitimac y o r
sta tu s. then the individual may dcri,·c leg itima cy or statu s
through that affiliation. T hi'> borrowed legitim acy o r
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becoming embroiled in operations or politics. Such
advice can benefit the entrepreneur in two ways when
negotiating with investors. First, the ex istence of the
board of advisors signal s that the entrepreneur is wi llin g
to listen to independent, outside adv ice. Second, th e
advisors can provide invaluabl e adv ice with respect to the
negotiations themselves.

entrepreneur's abi li ty to negotiate pos iti ve dea ls. We
have further suggested th at the strength of the
entrepreneur 's
resources
will
pos iti ve ly
bene fit
entreprene urs in th eir negoti ati ons with in ve tors. These
reso urces in c!ude protectab le inte ll ec tua I property, loya I
boa rd members, hi gh status alli ance partn ers and lega l
counse l, and an advi sory board .

Proposition 10: Entre prene urs with an advi sory
board will have more power relative to investors
than entrepreneurs with no advi sory board.
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